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This study investigates whether busy CEOs are associated with lower firm performance, and if this relationship is
moderated by firm growth, CEO tenure and corporate governance practices in Indonesia. This study uses 876
firms-year observations from 268 firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period spanning 2014
to 2017. We find that busy CEOs are associated with lower firm performance. This negative relationship is
stronger in firms with high growth and when busy CEOs have shorter tenure. We also show that corporate
governance practices have no impact on the negative relationship between CEO busyness and firm performance.
For firms and shareholders, our findings indicate that it is not a good idea for CEOs to hold two or more outside
directorships, particularly in the early years of taking up their CEO position. Our results suggest that restrictions
on CEO busyness would be beneficial to shareholders.1. Introduction
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) hold the top position in corporate
management and are responsible for company operations and perfor-
mance. Companies hire CEOs based on their expertise, experience and
ability to create value for shareholders. An experienced CEO that holds
directorships in other companies may be beneficial to firms as their
extended network can help to create new partnerships and expand firm
opportunities. However, too many outside commitments can make a CEO
too busy, causing a negative effect on firm operations and performance.
This study examines these issues in the context of Indonesia, by relating
the busyness of CEOs (called President Directors in Indonesia) to firm
performance.
Prior studies of boards of directors show that there are both benefits
and costs of directors holding outside directorships. Fama and Jensen
(1983) suggest that additional board seats are a signal of quality. Hillman
and Dalziel (2003) argue that board members with more relevant in-
dustry expertise, experience, knowledge and skills are able to make more
informed decisions to solve problems and improve firm performance.
Other studies argue that directors with outside directorships have
extensive social and professional networks to forge partnerships and deal
with existing regulations, have high integrity and a good reputation
(Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Field et al., 2013; Mendez et al., 2017).
However, when directors overextend themselves they become busier
and unfocused, which leads their performance to be less than optimal,d (I. Harymawan).
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negative effect of busy directors. Core et al. (1999) find that busy di-
rectors do not have enough time to carry out their duties. Jiraporn et al.
(2009) indicate that busier directors tend to miss more board meetings.
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show that busy directors are associated with
negative firm performance.
We apply these same arguments to CEO busyness in Indonesia, a
market where many CEOs of listed companies hold large numbers of
outside positions, but the busyness of corporate officers has not been
previously investigated. Using a sample of 876 firm-year observations of
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2017, we
test for a negative relationship between CEO busyness and firm perfor-
mance. We also examine whether this negative relationship is stronger in
high growth firms and in the early years of CEO tenure, and if strong
corporate governance practices help to alleviate the negative influence of
CEO busyness.
We find that the majority of CEOs are classified as busy in Indonesia
and that busy CEOs are associated with lower firm performance. This
indicates that CEOs with multiple outside directorships are distracted
and lose their focus, causing a damaging effect on firm performance. We
find consistent evidence that this negative relationship is stronger when
busy CEOs have shorter tenure and some evidence that it is stronger
when firm growth is higher. In these situations, it is even more important
for CEOs to be focused on firm operations and not be distracted by
outside activities. Finally, we find that corporate governance practicespril 2019
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firm performance. This suggests that boards of directors are not imple-
menting effective practices to limit the negative effect of busy CEOs on
firm operations.
This research makes a number of contributions. It identifies an issue
of current importance in Indonesia, in that some CEOs are too busy and
not focusing appropriate attention to their firm's operations. Our findings
indicate that it is not a good idea for CEOs to hold two or more outside
directorships. For firms experiencing high growth and for firms that have
recently hired a new CEO, this effect is even stronger, suggesting that
particular attention needs to be paid to this issue. Thus, this study extends
our knowledge of the characteristics of CEOs that are related to firm
performance. When hiring new CEOs it is important for firms to under-
stand the outside commitments of new CEOs and whether they can
devote enough attention to their position.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
outlines the relevant research and develops the hypotheses. Section 3
details the sample, variables and empirical models. Section 4 provides
the empirical analysis and results. Section 5 outlines the conclusions and
implications of the study.
2. Hypothesis
CEOs play an important role in guiding and driving the success of
their companies. In this study, we specifically examine the influence a
CEO with two or more outside directorships has on the performance of
their company. The existing literature has highlighted two schools of
thought with respect to CEOs holding additional positions in other
companies.
This first line of thinking is based on CEO reputation, expertise and
human capital. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the number of
outside board seats a corporate officer holds signals the quality of their
reputation. CEOs with better reputations will be in higher demand and
have greater opportunity to acquire additional positions in other com-
panies. With respect to expertise, a number of studies show that corpo-
rate officers with more experience and expertise in corporate
management are favoured by shareholders. For example, Fich (2005)
shows that shareholders react positively to the appointment of outside
directors with experience as CEOs of other companies, as the hiring firm
is expected to benefit from the expertise and experience of the CEO.
Other studies also argue that corporate officers with extensive social and
professional networks help companies to forge partnerships and deal
with existing and new regulations (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Field et al.,
2013; Mendez et al., 2017). Based on these arguments, we would expect a
positive relationship between CEOs with outside directorships and firm
performance.
The second school of thought is that multiple outside directorships
are a signal of busyness. Busyness causes the CEO to not have enough
time and energy to focus on the main tasks in managing the company. As
a result, firm activity will be disrupted and firm performance will
decrease. This view is in line with existing research on busy directors
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). For example, Ferris et al. (2003) show that
busy directors impose excessive restrictions on themselves, thereby
reducing the time and effort they devote to managing the company. Core
et al. (1999) also find that busy directors do not have enough time to
carry out their duties. Jiraporn et al. (2009) indicates that busier di-
rectors tend to miss more board meetings. Other studies have also shown
that the director's busyness interfere with their effectiveness in managing
the company (Cashman et al., 2012; Falato et al., 2014). These arguments
propose that CEOs with outside directorships are associated with nega-
tive firm performance.
In the context of this study, we expect the negative effect of CEO
busyness to overshadow any potential positive effects of CEO reputation,
expertise and human capital. Thus, our first hypothesis is:
H1. Busy CEOs are associated with lower firm performance.2This study also examines two specific situations where we expect the
negative effects of CEO busyness on firm performance to be even more
dramatic. These two situations are in high growth firms and in the early
years of a CEO's tenure. We believe that both of these situations require
the complete focus of the CEO and if the CEO is not fully focused on their
work, we expect the negative consequences of CEO busyness to be
greater.
In high growth firms, firmmanagement needs to be continually up-to-
date with market and industry conditions to ensure the company is
pressing ahead with its strategy and investing its limited resources in the
most beneficial areas. If the CEO of a firm is busy, due to many com-
mitments outside of the firm, we expect this loss of attention to incur a
greater cost on the performance of high growth firms, than in low growth
firms. Thus, we expect the negative effects of CEO busyness to be greater
in firms with high growth.
H2. The negative relationship between busy CEOs and firm perfor-
mance is stronger in high growth firms.
In addition, when a new CEO is hired by a company we expect that it
takes a substantial period of time for the new CEO to fully understand the
operations of the company and its competitive position in the market. If a
CEO also holds outside directorships, they may be distracted by their
other commitments and therefore not perform to their highest ability. We
expect this to be most serious in the early years of a CEO's tenure. In the
later years, a CEO will have already built up their knowledge and
expertise of the company's operations and its competitive position. Thus,
any distraction from outside directorships will have a smaller effect in
later years of a CEO's tenure. This argument is supported by prior studies
that show that directors perform better in their duties as their tenure
increases (Shiah-Hou and Cheng, 2012; Barker III and Mueller, 2002; Kor
and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Fama and Jensen, 1983).
H3. The negative relationship between busy CEOs and firm perfor-
mance is weaker in firms with long-tenured CEOs.
Since we predict a negative relationship between busy CEOs and firm
performance, we would like to further investigate whether this rela-
tionship is moderated by the corporate governance practices of com-
panies. Supervisory bodies, such as the board of directors, are expected to
monitor the activities of the CEO and be aware if their CEO has many
outside commitments. An effective board of directors would recommend
practices or take measures to limit the influence of the CEO's outside
activities in order to offset the negative effect of CEO busyness on firm
operations and performance. Thus, our final hypothesis investigates the
moderating effect of strong corporate governance practices (e.g. bigger
and more independent boards) on the relationship between CEO busy-
ness and firm performance.
H4. The negative relationship between busy CEOs and firm perfor-
mance is weaker in firms with stronger corporate governance practices.
3. Method
3.1. Data and sample
The initial sample consists of all companies listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange (BEI) for the period 2014–2017. Sources of data in this
study include company annual reports, ORBIS database and Bloomberg
website. Financial data was obtained from the ORBIS database. Data on
CEOs (called President Directors in Indonesia), including the number of
positions and the length of tenure, was obtained from the Bloomberg
website. Data for corporate governance variables was obtained from
company annual reports. These datasets were merged and the following
sample selection criteria were applied. First, all companies from the
finance, insurance and real estate industries (SIC 6) were excluded
because of the different nature of their financial statements. Second, any
observations without complete data were excluded from the sample.
After applying the sample selection criteria, the final sample includes 876
Table 2
Sample distribution.
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Industry Sector
Industry Busy CEOs Non-Busy
CEOs
Total
N % N % N %
(SIC 0) Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries
27 62.79 16 37.21 43 100
(SIC 1) Mining 82 58.57 58 41.43 140 100
(SIC 2) Construction Industries 106 42.91 141 57.09 247 100
(SIC 3) Manufacturing 89 54.94 73 45.06 162 100
(SIC 4) Transportation,
Communications and Utilities
87 70.73 36 29.27 123 100
(SIC 5) Wholesale & Retail Trade 46 54.76 38 45.24 84 100
(SIC 7) Service Industries 33 57.89 24 42.11 57 100
(SIC 8) Health, Legal, and
Educational Services and
Consulting
7 35.00 13 65.00 20 100
Total 477 54.45 399 45.55 876 100
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year
Year Busy CEOs Non-Busy
CEOs
Total
N % N % N %
2014 125 52.52 113 47.48 238 100
2015 131 54.81 108 45.19 239 100
2016 132 55.70 105 44.30 237 100
2017 89 54.94 73 45.06 162 100
Total 477 54.45 399 45.55 876 100
Notes: This table shows the sample distribution of companies that have busy and
non-busy CEOs. The sample includes 876 firm-year observations from companies
listed on the IDX during 2014–2017.
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3.2. Variable definitions
The main variable of interest in this study is the busyness of the CEO
(BUSYCEO). This is measured using a dummy variable, with CEOs
(President Directors) categorized as busy when they hold two or more
outside directorships (Core et al., 1999; Ferris et al., 2003; and Fich and
Shivdasani, 2006). Firm performance (FP) is the dependent variable and
is measured by return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and return
on equity (ROE). ROA is measured as net income divided by total assets.
ROS is measured as profit before interest expense and tax divided by total
sales. ROE is net income divided by the book value of total equity. These
three return variables are expressed as a percentage and are winsorized at
the 1% and 99% levels.
Referring to previous research (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Mendez
et al., 2017; Cashman et al., 2012; Field et al., 2013; Andres et al., 2013;
Kusnadi et al., 2016; Charas, 2015; Bravo and Reguera-Alvarado, 2017;
Habib et al., 2016; Harymawan and Nowland, 2016; Tao and Hutch-
inson, 2013) the control variables used in this study include: CEO tenure
(TENURE), the existence of a nomination and remuneration committee
(NRC), board size (BOARDSIZE), the percentage of independent com-
missioners (INDCOM), number of audit committee members (AUDCOM),
the existence of Big4 auditors (BIG4), firm leverage (LEVERAGE), firm
size (FIRMSIZE), firm age (FIRMAGE) and operating cash flow (OCF).
Financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. See Table 1
for a summary of variable definitions.
3.3. Methodology
This study uses an OLS regression model with fixed year and industry
effects, and clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009). To test the firstTable 1
Variable definitions.
Variable Definition Source
Dependent:
ROA
ROS
ROE
Net income divided by total assets (%).
Earnings before interest and tax divided by total
sales (%).
Net income divided by book value of total equity
(%).
ORBIS
ORBIS
ORBIS
Independent:
BUSYCEO
Dummy variable, 1 for CEOs who hold two or more
other directorships, and 0 for CEOs who hold less
than two other directorships.
Bloomberg
Controls:
TENURE Dummy variable, 1 for CEOs who have served their
company more than five years, and 0 for CEOs who
have served their company less than or equal to five
years.
Bloomberg
NRC Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a
Nomination and Remuneration Committee, and 0 if
the company does not have a Nomination and
Remuneration Committee.
Financial
Report
BOARDSIZE Natural logarithm of the number of members of the
board of directors and board of commissioners in
the company.
Financial
Report
INDCOM Percentage of independent commissioners in the
company.
Financial
Report
AUDCOM Number of members of the audit committee. Financial
Report
GROWTH The difference between total sales minus lag total
sales scaled by lag total sales.
ORBIS
LEVERAGE Total debt divided by total assets. ORBIS
FIRMSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. ORBIS
FIRMAGE
OCF
Natural logarithm of the number of years since the
company was founded.
Net cash flow from operating activities divided by
total assets.
ORBIS
ORBIS
BIG4 Dummy variable, 1 for companies audited by Big 4
auditors, and 0 for companies audited by other
auditors.
Financial
Report
3hypothesis in this study, the following regression model is used. Based on
Hypothesis 1, we expect the coefficient on BUSYCEO to be negative.
FPi;t ¼ β0 þ β1BUSYCEOi;t þ β2TENUREi;t þ β3RNCi;t þ β4BOARDSIZEi;t
þ β5INDCOMi;t þ β6AUDCOMi;t þ β7BIG4i;t þ β8GROWTHi;t
þ β9LEVERAGEi;t þ β10FIRMSIZEi;t þ β11FIRMAGEi;t þ β12OCFi;t
þ YEARi;t þ INDUSTRYi;t þ εi;t
(1)To test the second hypothesis, model 2 is used. We expect the coef-
ficient on BUSYCEO*GROWTH to be negative.
FPi;t ¼ β0 þ β1BUSYCEO  GROWTHi;t þ β2BUSYCEOi;t þ β3TENUREi;t
þ β4RNCi;t þ β5BOARDSIZEi;t þ β6INDCOMi;t þ β7AUDCOMi;t
þ β8BIG4i;t þ β9GROWTHi;t þ β10LEVERAGEi;t þ β11FIRMSIZEi;t
þ β12FIRMAGEi;t þ β13OCFi;t þ YEARi;t þ INDUSTRYi;t þ εi;t
(2)
For the third hypothesis, we use model 3. We expect the coefficient on
BUSYCEO*TENURE to be positive.
FPi;t ¼ β0 þ β1BUSYCEO*TENUREi;t þ β2BUSYCEOi;t þ β3TENUREi;t
þ β4RNCi;t þ β5BOARDSIZEi;t þ β6INDCOMi;t þ β7AUDCOMi;t
þ β8BIG4i;t þ β9GROWTHi;t þ β10LEVERAGEi;t þ β11FIRMSIZEi;t
þ β12FIRMAGEi;t þ β13OCFi;t þ YEARi;t þ INDUSTRYi;t þ εi;t
(3)
The fourth hypothesis is tested using model 4. We expect the coeffi-
cient on BUSYCEO*GOV to be positive, where GOV represents the
corporate governance variables BOARSIZE, INDCOM and RNC.
FPi;t ¼ β0 þ β1BUSYCEO*GOVi;t þ β2BUSYCEOi;t þ β3TENUREi;t
þ β4RNCi;t þ β5BOARDSIZEi;t þ β6INDCOMi;t þ β7AUDCOMi;t
þ β8BIG4i;t þ β9GROWTHi;t þ β10LEVERAGEi;t þ β11FIRMSIZEi;t
þ β12FIRMAGEi;t þ β13OCFi;t þ YEARi;t þ INDUSTRYi;t þ εi;t (4)
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Panel A: Companies with Busy CEOs (N ¼ 477)
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum
ROA 3.569 2.730 -19.600 39.480
ROS 3.189 7.030 -237.860 84.179
ROE 5.490 5.460 -98.610 89.890
TENURE 0.518 1.000 0.000 1.000
RNC 0.447 0.000 0.000 1.000
BOARDSIZE 2.231 2.303 1.386 3.135
INDCOM 37.665 33.333 0.000 80.000
AUDCOM 3.023 3.000 0.000 6.000
BIG4 0.549 1.000 0.000 1.000
GROWTH 0.111 0.051 -0.689 4.369
LEVERAGE 0.411 0.435 0.000 0.919
FIRMSIZE (Rp) 13,640,000,000.000 5,286,000,000.000 28,065,313.000 97,090,000,000.000
FIRMAGE 3.332 3.367 1.609 4.745
OCF 0.077 0.063 -0.157 0.423
Panel B: Companies with Non-Busy CEOs (N ¼ 399)
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum
ROA 4.052 3.170 -19.600 39.480
ROS 5.404 7.440 -237.860 84.179
ROE 5.683 7.180 -98.610 89.890
TENURE 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000
RNC 0.261 0.000 0.000 1.000
BOARDSIZE 2.112 2.079 1.386 3.332
INDCOM 38.089 33.333 0.000 100.000
AUDCOM 2.880 3.000 0.000 5.000
BIG4 0.366 0.000 0.000 1.000
GROWTH 0.090 0.066 -0.689 4.369
LEVERAGE 0.413 0.435 0.000 0.919
FIRMSIZE (Rp) 6,702,000,000.000 1,700,000,000.000 28,065,313.000 97,090,000,000.000
FIRMAGE 3.440 3.497 1.792 4.745
OCF 0.070 0.059 -0.157 0.423
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in this study. The sample includes 876 firm-year observations from companies listed on the IDX
during 2014–2017.
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4.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate comparisons
Table 2 contains the sample distribution by industry sector in Panel A,
and by year in Panel B. The sample firms are distributed across the eight
industry sectors, with the highest number of firm-year observations
coming from Construction Industries (247), Manufacturing (162) and
Mining (140). There are 238 firm-year observations from 2014, 239 from
2015, 237 from 2016 and 162 from 2017. Of the total of 876 firm-year
observations, 477 (54%) are from firms with busy CEOs. Thus, busy
CEOs are present in the majority of companies.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of companies with Busy CEOs
(Panel A) and companies with Non-Busy CEOs (Panel B). In Panel A,
companies with Busy CEOs have mean ROA, ROS and ROE of 3.569%,
3.189% and 5.490%. The average board size is 9.31 directors and com-
missioners, and 51.8% of companies have a long-tenured CEO (more than
5 years of service). The average percentage of independent commis-
sioners is 37.665%. A total of 44.7% of companies have a nomination and
remuneration committee, and 54.9% hire a Big4 auditor. The average
company has total assets of IDR 13,640,000,000,000, leverage of 41.1%,
growth of 11.1% and operating cash flow of 7.7% of total assets.
In Panel B, companies with Non-Busy CEOs have mean ROA, ROS and
ROE of 4.052%, 5.404% and 5.683%. The average board size is 8.26 di-
rectors and commissioners, and 44.4% of companies have a long-tenured
CEO (more than 5 years of service). The average percentage of indepen-
dent commissioners is 39.089%. A total of 26.1% of companies have a
nomination and remuneration committee, and 36.6% hire a Big4 auditor.
The average company has total assets of IDR 6,702,000,000,000, leverage
of 41.3%, growth of 9.0% and operating cash flow of 7.0% of total assets.
Table 4 displays the Pearson correlations. The correlations between4BUSYCEO and the firm performance measures, ROA, ROS and ROE, are
in the predicted direction, but insignificant. Other correlations between
independent variables are generally low and don't raise any multi-
collinearity issues for our subsequent analysis. Unreported variance
inflation factors (VIFs) have an average of 1.40 and a high of 2.40.
Table 5 shows the results of t-tests and Wilcoxon tests between firms
with and without a BUSYCEO. These tests show that firm performance
(ROA, ROS and ROE) is generally lower in firms with a busy CEO,
however these differences are not statistically significant. The other re-
sults indicate that firms with busy CEOs are more likely to have bigger
boards, a nomination and remuneration committee, a longer tenured
CEO, a bigger audit committee, a Big4 auditor, and are bigger and
younger firms. These differences in corporate governance variables are
examined in Hypothesis 4.4.2. CEO busyness and firm performance
Table 6 shows the results of model 1. We hypothesize a negative
relationship between busy CEOs and firm performance. In the first
specification, we find a significant negative relationship between ROA
and busy CEOs. The coefficient on BUSYCEO is -1.333 (t ¼ -2.58) and is
significant at the 5% level. In the second specification, we also find a
significant negative relationship between ROS and busy CEOs. The co-
efficient is -6.810 (t¼ -2.38) and is significant at the 5% level. In the third
specification, using ROE, the coefficient on BUSYCEO is negative, but not
significant (-1.880, t ¼ *1.31). These results for ROA and ROS are
consistent with Hypothesis 1 and indicate that firm performance is lower
in firms whose CEOs hold two or more outside directorships.
The results of our analysis are consistent with the literature on di-
rector busyness (Core et al., 1999; Ferris et al., 2003; Fich and Shivda-
sani, 2006). In particular, our results show that CEO busyness
overshadows any human capital or networking benefits attained from
Table 4
Pearson correlations.
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]
[1] ROA 1.000
[2] ROS 0.472*** 1.000
(0.000)
[3] ROE 0.849*** 0.446*** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
[4] BUSYCEO -0.027 -0.028 -0.004 1.000
(0.422) (0.400) (0.898)
[5] TENURE -0.025 0.053 -0.002 0.074** 1.000
(0.459) (0.115) (0.956) (0.029)
[6] RNC 0.168*** 0.105*** 0.124*** 0.193*** -0.064* 1.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.059)
[7] BOARDSIZE 0.233*** 0.187*** 0.240*** 0.167*** -0.009 0.322*** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.797) (0.000)
[8] INDCOM -0.055 -0.035 -0.054 -0.017 0.115*** -0.010 0.058* 1.000
(0.104) (0.300) (0.112) (0.617) (0.001) (0.765) (0.086)
[9] AUDCOM 0.083** 0.074** 0.080** 0.101*** -0.004 0.146*** 0.236*** 0.057* 1.000
(0.014) (0.029) (0.018) (0.003) (0.917) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092)
[10] BIG4 0.241*** 0.127*** 0.186*** 0.183*** -0.080** 0.216*** 0.377*** -0.009 0.214*** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.792) (0.000)
[11] GROWTH 0.053 0.013 0.075** 0.022 -0.068** -0.032 -0.041 0.004 0.032 -0.032 1.000
(0.120) (0.694) (0.026) (0.513) (0.044) (0.352) (0.222) (0.916) (0.346) (0.343)
[12] LEVERAGE -0.239*** 0.007 -0.179*** -0.004 -0.050 0.058* 0.009 0.034 -0.035 -0.015 -0.069** 1.000
(0.000) (0.841) (0.000) (0.912) (0.142) (0.084) (0.797) (0.308) (0.297) (0.655) (0.041)
[13] FIRMSIZE 0.158*** 0.174*** 0.179*** 0.275*** -0.080** 0.375*** 0.668*** 0.099*** 0.247*** 0.416*** -0.014 0.110*** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.671) (0.001)
[14] FIRMAGE 0.129*** 0.048 0.107*** -0.099*** 0.034 0.008 0.166*** -0.014 0.002 0.056* -0.074** -0.025 -0.022 1.000
(0.000) (0.158) (0.001) (0.003) (0.319) (0.813) (0.000) (0.689) (0.955) (0.099) (0.029) (0.460) (0.514)
[15] OCF 0.547*** 0.230*** 0.433*** 0.039 -0.018 0.205*** 0.183*** -0.054 0.108*** 0.275*** -0.017 -0.072** 0.122*** 0.008 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.248) (0.595) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.001) (0.000) (0.618) (0.034) (0.000) (0.805)
Notes: This table shows Pearson Correlation test results. The sample includes 876 firm-year observations from companies listed on the IDX during 2014–2017. Tests show: *t> 1,645, **t> 1,960, ***t> 2,326, significance
at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table 5
T-tests and Wilcoxon tests.
Variables BUSYCEO BUSYCEO t-value z-value
¼ 1 ¼ 0
N ¼ 477 N ¼ 399
ROA 3.569 4.052 -0.804 -1.299
ROS 3.189 5.404 -0.842 -0.505
ROE 5.490 5.683 -0.129 -1.189
TENURE 0.518 0.444 2.192** 2.188**
RNC 0.447 0.261 5.804*** 5.699***
BOARDSIZE 2.231 2.112 4.993*** 5.350***
INDCOM 37.665 38.089 -0.501 -0.429
AUDCOM 3.023 2.880 3.002*** 3.134***
BIG4 0.549 0.366 5.505*** 5.415***
GROWTH 0.111 0.090 0.654 -1.087
LEVERAGE 0.411 0.413 -0.110 -0.022
FIRMSIZE 29.184 28.243 8.461*** 8.579***
FIRMAGE 3.332 3.440 -2.953*** -2.506**
OCF 0.077 0.070 1.156 0.797
Notes: This table shows the characteristics of companies that have busy and non-
busy CEOs. The sample includes 876 firm-year observations from companies
listed on the IDX during 2014–2017. The t-test results are displayed with *t >
1,645, **t> 1,960, ***t> 2,326, significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. The Wilcoxon
(z-test) result are displayed with *z > 1,640, **z > 1,960, ***z > 2,570, sig-
nificance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
I. Harymawan et al. Heliyon 5 (2019) e01601holding directorship positions in other companies. While it is important
for CEOs to gain additional expertise and experience from outside sour-
ces, and to foster connections with regulators, government officials and
other executives (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Field et al., 2013; Mendez
et al., 2017), this should not be done at the expense of their primary
occupation. As CEOs of listed companies, their primary focus should be
on the performance of their company. Our results are consistent with
CEOs holding two or more other directorships as being distracted orTable 6
CEO busyness and firm performance.
Variables ROA ROS ROE
BUSYCEO -1.333** -6.810** -1.880
(-2.58) (-2.38) (-1.31)
TENURE -0.121 6.015** 0.604
(-0.24) (2.21) (0.44)
RNC 1.280** 2.484 1.819
(2.24) (0.77) (1.13)
BOARDSIZE 1.048 7.443 4.684*
(1.02) (1.22) (1.68)
INDCOM -0.022 -0.253*** -0.088
(-1.10) (-2.85) (-1.45)
AUDCOM 0.068 0.692 0.558
(0.26) (0.49) (0.62)
BIG4 0.706 0.840 -0.451
(1.24) (0.32) (-0.28)
GROWTH 1.014 2.112 3.349**
(1.50) (0.34) (2.08)
LEVERAGE -9.174*** 4.953 -13.123***
(-6.49) (0.66) (-2.63)
FIRMSIZE 0.581** 2.632* 1.860**
(2.36) (1.79) (2.54)
FIRMAGE 1.325*** 2.196 2.433*
(2.91) (0.88) (1.84)
OCF 46.411*** 83.104*** 92.640***
(10.19) (4.13) (8.88)
CONSTANT -17.789*** -85.135** -67.782***
(-2.87) (-2.42) (-3.75)
Year Dummies Included Included Included
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
R-squared 0.416 0.139 0.297
N 876 876 876
Notes: This table shows the results of OLS regressions between CEO busyness and
firm performance. The sample includes 876 firm-year observations from com-
panies listed on the IDX during 2014–2017. Asterisks indicate: *t > 1,645, **t >
1,960, ***t > 2,326, significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
6overburdened and not focusing enough of their time and energy on their
own company's performance.
Across the three specifications, the results for the control variables
are not perfectly consistent, but provide some evidence that firm
performance is higher in bigger and older firms, firms with higher
operating cashflow and growth, and lower leverage. There is also
evidence that firm performance is higher for longer-tenured CEOs,
firms with nomination and remuneration committees, and when board
size is bigger but the proportion of independent commissioners is
lower.
4.3. CEO busyness, firm growth and tenure
Table 7 shows the results of models 2 and 3. We hypothesize a
negative coefficient on BUSYCEO*GROWTH and a positive coefficient
on BUSYCEO*TENURE. The first group of three specifications
examine Hypothesis 2. We find that the coefficients on BUSYCEO*-
GROWTH are -1.532 (t ¼ -1.06), -9.596 (-0.90) and -7.642 (t ¼
-1.93), with the latter one significant at the 10% level. While the
results for ROA and ROS are insignificant, the result for ROE provides
some support for Hypothesis 2 and indicates that the negative rela-
tionship between busy CEOs and firm performance is more pro-
nounced in firms with high growth. This suggests that companies
growing faster need the immediate attention of their CEO in their
daily operations, and CEOs that have too many outside directorships
have a loss of attention that incurs a greater cost on the performance
of high growth firms.
The second group of specifications examine Hypothesis 3. The results
show that the coefficients on BUSYCEO*TENURE are 1.722 (t ¼ 1.79),
9.098 (t ¼ 1.90) and 4.977 (t ¼ 1.96) across the three specifications, all
significant at the 10% level. This shows strong support for Hypothesis 3
and indicates that the negative relationship between busy CEOs and firm
performance is strongest when CEOs have tenure of less than 5 years.
This suggests that new and shorter-tenure CEOs are more easily
distracted by their outside directorships, causing lower performance in
the firm where they are CEO.
Interestingly, the results also show that the negative effect of busy
CEOs on firm performance basically disappears for long-serving CEOs.
When the coefficients on BUSYCEO and BUSYCEO*TENURE are added
together, the net effect is close to zero in all three specifications. This
indicates that long-serving CEOs are better at managing their outside
commitments than more recently hired CEOs.
4.4. CEO busyness and corporate governance
Table 8 shows the results of model 4. We predict that stronger
corporate governance practices will help to alleviate the negative effect
of busy CEOs on firm performance, hence a positive coefficient is ex-
pected on the BUSYCEO*GOV interaction terms. The three groups of
specifications show the results for the GOV variables of BOARDSIZE,
INDCOM and RNC. Across the nine specifications, we find no signifi-
cant positive coefficients. The only significant result is a negative co-
efficient on BUSYCEO*INDCOM in the ROS specification. This result
indicates that a higher proportion of independent commissioners ex-
acerbates the negative relationship between busy CEOs and firm
performance.
Overall, we find no support for Hypothesis 4, which indicates that
corporate governance has no measurable impact on the negative influ-
ence of busy CEOs on firm performance in Indonesia. This result is
somewhat disappointing as Indonesia has undertaken a program to
improve the corporate governance practices of listed companies over the
past decade. Our results suggest that further improvements are needed as
the corporate governance variables we test have no measurable effect on
the supervision of the CEO. An effective supervisory and enforcement
mechanism would be desirable to reduce the ability of CEOs to take on
too many responsibilities outside of the firm.
Table 7
CEO busyness, firm growth and tenure.
Variables (1) (2)
ROA ROS ROE ROA ROS ROE
BUSYCEO*GROWTH -1.532 -9.596 -7.642*
(-1.06) (-0.90) (-1.93)
BUSYCEO*TENURE 1.722* 9.098* 4.977*
(1.79) (1.90) (1.96)
BUSYCEO -1.196** -5.951* -1.196 -2.148*** -11.118*** -4.237**
(-2.30) (-1.87) (-0.80) (-2.88) (-2.65) (-2.09)
TENURE -0.098 6.159** 0.719 -1.065 1.033 -2.122
(-0.19) (2.29) (0.53) (-1.47) (0.28) (-1.07)
RNC 1.301** 2.620 1.928 1.324** 2.718 1.947
(2.30) (0.84) (1.20) (2.34) (0.85) (1.22)
BOARDSIZE 0.978 7.006 4.336 1.119 7.819 4.890*
(0.96) (1.15) (1.57) (1.09) (1.28) (1.75)
INDCOM -0.020 -0.242*** -0.080 -0.018 -0.232*** -0.077
(-1.01) (-2.76) (-1.30) (-0.88) (-2.66) (-1.23)
AUDCOM 0.061 0.647 0.522 0.080 0.752 0.591
(0.23) (0.45) (0.57) (0.31) (0.54) (0.66)
BIG4 0.680 0.676 -0.582 0.668 0.635 -0.563
(1.20) (0.26) (-0.36) (1.16) (0.24) (-0.35)
GROWTH 2.097* 8.892 8.750** 1.005 2.061 3.322**
(1.75) (1.20) (2.39) (1.50) (0.34) (2.07)
LEVERAGE -9.238*** 4.554 -13.441*** -9.317*** 4.196 -13.537***
(-6.54) (0.61) (-2.69) (-6.58) (0.56) (-2.74)
FIRMSIZE 0.594** 2.718* 1.929*** 0.557** 2.505* 1.791**
(2.39) (1.82) (2.64) (2.28) (1.73) (2.46)
FIRMAGE 1.333*** 2.246 2.473* 1.337*** 2.259 2.468*
(2.94) (0.91) (1.89) (2.93) (0.91) (1.87)
OCF 46.604*** 84.317*** 93.606*** 46.418*** 83.145*** 92.663***
(10.37) (4.29) (9.08) (10.23) (4.15) (8.92)
CONSTANT -18.214*** -87.792** -69.898*** -17.104*** -81.516** -65.802***
(-2.90) (-2.45) (-3.87) (-2.79) (-2.37) (-3.65)
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
R-squared 0.417 0.142 0.302 0.418 0.142 0.299
N 876 876 876 876 876 876
Notes: This table shows the results of OLS regressions between CEO busyness and firm performance, with interactions with firm growth and CEO tenure. The sample
includes 876 firm-year observations from companies listed on the IDX during 2014–2017. Asterisks indicate: *t> 1,645, **t> 1,960, ***t> 2,326, significance at 10%,
5% and 1%.
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This study investigates whether CEOs with multiple outside di-
rectorships are busy and associated with lower firm performance. This is
an important current issue in Indonesia as our analysis indicates that
more than 50% of CEOs (President Directors) of listed companies on the
Indonesian Stock Exchange have multiple appointments in other
companies.
We find that busy CEOs are associatedwith lower firm performance in
Indonesia. This result indicates that CEO busyness is a problem, in that
CEOs are not effectively devoting sufficient time and energy to their
firms. It seems that their focus is being divided across their different
positions, resulting in a damaging effect on firm operations. We find
some evidence that this is even more or a problem in high growth firms,
where the changing conditions facing the firm require the constant and
ongoing attention of the CEO.
It is also a more serious issue when a new CEO has been recently
hired. We find that the negative effect of busy CEOs on firm performance
is more pronounced for low-tenure CEOs. When a new CEO has been
hired it takes time for the new CEO to fully understand the operations of
the company and its competitive position in the market. If a CEO also
holds outside directorships, they may be distracted by their other com-
mitments and therefore not perform to their highest ability. However,
this issue disappears as CEO tenure increases. In later years, a CEO will
have already built up their knowledge and expertise of the company's
operations and its competitive position. Thus, any distraction from
outside directorships has a minimal impact on firm performance.7Together, these results indicate that CEO busyness should be
restricted in Indonesia. In general, our results show that limiting the
outside involvement of the CEO would have a positive impact on firm
performance. It is only after CEOs have tenure of 5 years or more in the
firm that there is minimal impact from holding multiple outside
positions.
Finally, we find that stronger corporate governance practices do
not help to alleviate the negative effect of CEO busyness on firm
performance. This suggests that boards of directors are either not
aware of this issue or have not been successful in implementing
practices to offset the negative effect of CEO busyness. Further
investigation of corporate governance practices that could effectively
mitigate this issue is warranted and would be a good avenue for
future research.
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Table 8
CEO busyness and corporate governance.
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
ROA ROS ROE ROA ROS ROE ROA ROS ROE
BUSYCEO*BOARDSIZE 1.208 -0.621 1.664
(0.81) (-0.08) (0.37)
BUSYCEO*INDCOM -0.031 -0.416** 0.077
(-0.81) (-2.33) (0.63)
BUSYCEO*RNC 0.031 4.606 -3.542
(0.03) (0.92) (-1.21)
BUSYCEO -3.934 -5.473 -5.464 -0.159 8.915 -4.791 -1.343** -8.349** -0.697
(-1.18) (-0.28) (-0.55) (-0.10) (1.29) (-1.02) (-2.24) (-2.39) (-0.43)
TENURE -0.132 6.021** 0.590 -0.143 5.732** 0.657 -0.121 6.078** 0.556
(-0.26) (2.23) (0.43) (-0.28) (2.12) (0.47) (-0.24) (2.24) (0.41)
RNC 1.244** 2.502 1.770 1.293** 2.665 1.786 1.261 -0.259 3.929*
(2.14) (0.78) (1.08) (2.25) (0.82) (1.11) (1.62) (-0.06) (1.70)
BOARDSIZE 0.560 7.693 4.012 1.015 7.005 4.765* 1.048 7.492 4.646*
(0.47) (1.10) (1.20) (0.98) (1.13) (1.71) (1.02) (1.22) (1.67)
INDCOM -0.020 -0.254*** -0.086 -0.007 -0.060 -0.124 -0.022 -0.253*** -0.088
(-1.02) (-2.76) (-1.40) (-0.33) (-0.58) (-1.52) (-1.10) (-2.84) (-1.45)
AUDCOM 0.072 0.690 0.564 0.072 0.743 0.548 0.068 0.696 0.555
(0.28) (0.49) (0.62) (0.28) (0.52) (0.60) (0.26) (0.49) (0.62)
BIG4 0.667 0.860 -0.506 0.715 0.953 -0.472 0.707 0.976 -0.556
(1.16) (0.33) (-0.31) (1.25) (0.37) (-0.29) (1.23) (0.37) (-0.34)
GROWTH 1.038 2.100 3.382** 1.028 2.299 3.315** 1.014 2.075 3.377**
(1.55) (0.34) (2.10) (1.52) (0.37) (2.06) (1.50) (0.34) (2.07)
LEVERAGE -9.120*** 4.925 -13.048*** -9.197*** 4.651 -13.067*** -9.172*** 5.245 -13.347***
(-6.44) (0.65) (-2.61) (-6.50) (0.62) (-2.63) (-6.50) (0.70) (-2.67)
FIRMSIZE 0.564** 2.640* 1.838** 0.575** 2.554* 1.875** 0.580** 2.574* 1.905***
(2.31) (1.81) (2.48) (2.32) (1.74) (2.56) (2.34) (1.76) (2.59)
FIRMAGE 1.317*** 2.200 2.422* 1.328*** 2.244 2.424* 1.324*** 2.160 2.460*
(2.91) (0.89) (1.84) (2.92) (0.91) (1.83) (2.91) (0.87) (1.86)
OCF 46.517*** 83.050*** 92.786*** 46.235*** 80.751*** 93.076*** 46.407*** 82.567*** 93.053***
(10.25) (4.13) (8.86) (10.19) (4.01) (8.95) (10.19) (4.10) (8.90)
CONSTANT -16.424*** -85.837** -65.901*** -18.111*** -89.444** -66.985*** -17.775*** -83.085** -69.359***
(-2.69) (-2.50) (-3.45) (-2.92) (-2.53) (-3.74) (-2.84) (-2.37) (-3.78)
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
R-squared 0.417 0.139 0.297 0.417 0.143 0.297 0.416 0.140 0.298
N 876 876 876 876 876 876 876 876 876
Notes:This table shows the results of OLS regressions between CEO busyness and firm performance, with interactions with corporate governance variables. The sample
includes 876 firm-year observations from companies listed on the IDX during 2014–2017. Asterisks indicate: *t> 1,645, **t> 1,960, ***t> 2,326, significance at 10%,
5% and 1%.
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